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Abstract  
Over decades now, studies on board compositions have been centered on well-structured market and 
institutions to the disadvantage of small and medium firms who are also drivers of growth. This paper 
therefore seeks to examine how non-listed private family owned firms’ performance are affected by certain 
board structural characteristics. Using hierarchical regression analysis with 319 firms in Ghana, on one hand 
the result reveals that a higher proportion of non-executive directors impacted negatively on the positive effect 
of CEO duality. On the other hand, we could not adduce any evidence to suggest that family firms’ board of 
directors’ diversity have influence on the impact of non-executive director’s effect on performance. We 
therefore proposed that growing non-listed family firms should lessen the use of non-executive directors when 
the CEO plays dual role in the firm. The study therefore provides empirical evidence that composition of board 
of privately owned family firms affect performance and further gives insight and credence to the need to 
influence the application of good corporate governance in such businesses and in a faction different from what 
has been suggested in general literature of board 
Keywords: Board Composition Family Business; Directors; Performance; CEO.
 
1.0  Introduction  
Generally, corporate governance literature with specific 
reference to board of directors have seen several studies 
that attempt to examine the effect of certain variables 
related to board composition on firm performance (e.g. 
Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Frimpong and Kuutol, 2017, 
Djan, Zehou and Bawuah 2017). Notwithstanding the 
above, much studies have not been seen regarding family 
firms’ board composition and firm performance 
(Bettineli, 2011), suggesting more opportunity for 
further research.  Our review of boards and family 
business literature shows that most empirical studies 
adopts sample public (listed) family firms (e.g. Prabowo 
and Simpson, 2011; San Martin-Reyna and Duran-
Encalada, 2012; Leung et al, 2014; Cabrera-Suárez and 
Martín-Santana, 2015) to the neglect of private (unlisted) 
family firms or uses combination of both public (listed) 
family and private (unlisted) firms (e.g Oswald et al. 
2009) but the characteristics in family listed firm are or  
could be potentially different from that of the unlisted 
family firms because listed firms have some special 
regulations which are not applicable to unlisted firms. 
There is almost non-existence of studies that focus on 
private family firms (Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-
Santana, 2015), the few that exist either focus on factors 
that determine a specific boards composition in public 
family firms (e.g. Klein, 2007; Bammens et al, 2008) or 
more fewer examining the relationship between board 
composition and performance (e.g. Maseda et al., 2015; 
Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-Santana, 2015). In the light 
of empirical review on the relationship between board 
composition and family firm performance, the findings 
have been mixed and this link is even more unclear in 
the case of private family firms (Masweda et al., 2014; 
Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-Santana, 2015). However, 
we believe boards have and should play a key role in the 
performance of private firms and by extension private 
(unlisted) family firms and thus boards as a potential tool 
to prevent possible failure in several of such family firms 
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(Bammens et al., 2008). Therefore, Cabrera-Suárez and 
Martín-Santana (2015) summit that by studying the 
function of boards in private family businesses, it 
presents an important or specific findings and 
recommendations other than that of the general corporate 
governance studies, which can be better defined and 
adopted to suit a particular organization (Chen and 
Nowland, 2010).  
In board of directors literature relating to family 
businesses, two key functions are highlighted, board as 
an internal administrative body that exercise control and 
the provision of advice with agency and stewardship 
theories as the main theoretical approaches (Bammens et 
al., 2011). From the point of view of agency theory, 
boards of directors are to mitigate moral hazard 
problems relative to family businesses. These agency 
problems emerges from two main source, pursuit of 
economic and non-economic interest of owning-family 
to the determent of minority shareholders; and intra-
family divergence of interest owing to generational 
evolution of the firms (Bammens et al., 2011). On the 
other hand, stewardship theory suggest that decision-
makers show particular situational factors like strong 
involvement and identification as well as personal and 
social fulfillment. These factors motivate the decision-
makers to be organizational oriented instead of 
opportunistic oriented as explained by agency theory. 
Thus, board function is to support and advice 
management but not controlling management (Bammens 
et al., 2011). Therefore, we submit that stewardship 
behaviour as opposed to agency problems are most 
likely to persist in private family businesses other than 
listed family businesses hence there are special 
characteristics expected to have influence on the 
function of board of directors in private family 
businesses and by extension composition. Definitely, 
characteristics like CEO duality and proportion 
executive directors are normally address in general board 
composition studies but barely untouched in family 
firms’ studies. Since the CEO duality and presence of 
more executive directors are more prevalent in private 
family businesses, this present a research gap and 
opportunity for further research in this regard. 
Additionally, it seems that recommendations regarding 
good corporate governance tend to support the idea that 
independent directors are more efficient even though 
empirical evidence is inconclusive (García-Ramos and 
García-Olalla, 2011a), nevertheless, this may not be true 
for family businesses particularly private family firms 
(Arosaet al., 2010). Even if it is true this study is more 
relevant in sub-Sahara Africa and for that matter Ghana 
because there is a low level of protection of external 
investors’ interest and boards of directors become very 
relevant as a mechanism of corporate governance in 
family firms. Also, emerging countries are increasingly 
embracing the concept of corporate governance, 
however, the focus has largely been on the bigger firms 
and/or listed firms.  
Thus, this study aims to provide new evidence on the 
highly under researched area of corporate governance in 
family firms, by so doing, we examine the relationship 
between board composition and performance in private 
family firms in the context of sub-Sahara Africa. We 
submit that the first evidence of study in unlisted family 
firms in relation to board composition and performance 
was carried out in Spain by (Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-
Santana, 2015), but the findings may not be adoptable 
because of contextual and country specific issues and the 
uniqueness of variables selected could possibly be the 
first to study in Sub-Sahara Africa.  
As far as we know this is the first study including such 
kind of data about the boards in private family firms. 
The study is structured as follows; firstly, the theoretical 
framework begins with a discussion of the special nature 
of the private family firm, then, the analysis of the 
consequences of these special features on the roles of the 
board and on its composition allows the hypotheses of 
the study to be proposed. Secondly, the methodology 
used to obtain and process the data and define the 
variables is outlined. After that, the results are presented 
and the final section presents the main conclusions 
drawn from the discussion of the results and establishes 
the limitations of the study, making suggestions for 
future research. Ghana can be seen as a country with no 
or small legal framework for family business, therefore, 
there is a low level of external investors’ protection, 
given credence to corporate governance mechanism, 
hence, the Ghanaian context is quite suitable for this 
research given its particular characteristics.  
2.0 Theory and hypotheses 
2.1 The private family firm: stewardship and 
psychosocial altruism 
As theory suggest and consequently the hypotheses are 
based on the idea that private family firms have more 
crucial defining faces than that of the public traded 
family firms (Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-Santana, 
2015), family firm that are private correspond to what 
theory defines as family firm, given the fact that 
shareholder base is concentrated and members of the 
family are active in the management team as well as on 
the board (Lane et al., 2006). Private family business as 
advance by Bammens et al (2011) are used as a tool for 
the sustainability transgenerational economics and socio-
emotional needs. Therefore, in family business, family 
members are actively involved in the management and 
ownership and thus see the firm as their life blood. The 
kind of family ties and relationship that exist have a 
greater impact on the firm functioning ability, to the 
extent that success or failure rest on it.  But in the public 
listed family firms, it may include non-family owners 
who may want to play an active role in the firm 
governance and by extension, decision-making process 
by trying to exert economic and financial interest over 
the family non-economic and non-financial interest. In 
most cases, listed family firms aspirations and interest 
and approach to family are undermined due to pressures 
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and conditional factors exerted by external stakeholders 
(Dyer, 1986) and the fact non-family member have 
ownership interest the ease of information flow that are 
mostly present in family firms are undermined and erode 
intimacy among family members. It is also worth noting 
that the nature and the size of private family firms and 
that of it counterpart public listed firms differs and this is 
also seen in the size of the family (Cabrera-Suárez and 
Martín-Santana, 2015). We are therefore with the 
opinion that bigger family firms will loss it family ties 
and weaken relationship and thereafter affect the social 
capital enjoyed by the family but the reverse will be the 
case for smaller family firms. Since we know social 
capital exist in smaller family firms, it ensure that family 
members work within the conformity of the family 
norms (Haffman et al., 2006) and this will strengthen the 
family bonds and ties. As stronger the ties of family 
members becomes, it encourages the creation of 
favorable conditions to ethical behavior in both the 
family and the firm. There is therefore a higher 
propensity of smaller private family firms to show 
stewardship behaviour (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011). 
Thus, the assumptions underlining stewardship theory 
suggest that executive behaviour may not only gear 
towards private interests but also could be motivated by 
general interests of a firm (Davis et al., 1997). In the 
light of this assumption, owner-managers of private 
family firms uses the firm as tools to sustain generational 
and economic needs of the family but public traded 
family firms as the case may be, will present a distance 
between the family and the firm hence the incentive to 
exploit to the disadvantage of the firm (Bammens et al., 
2011). Therefore, private family firm tends to show 
stewardship behaviour and this could explain why this 
form of family firms mostly tend to rely on relational 
governance rather than contractual governance (Cabrera-
Suárez and Martín-Santana, 2015). Further to this social 
dynamics tool like trust, commitment and shared vision 
play a significant role in private held family business 
(Calabrò and Mussolino, 2011).  These unique 
governance characteristics are expected to influence in 
the management and board composition of privately held 
family business.  
2.2 The executive directors’ role  
From the perspective of traditional agency theory, 
executive director presence on firm’s board can be a 
compromising factor on board decision and supervision 
of management activities. Fama and Jensen (1983) posit 
that management stand the chance of making decisions 
that benefit them to the disadvantage of owners’ interest 
in the firm. Hence a higher percentage of executive 
directors’ presence on firm board have a potential to 
reduce supervision role of board and eventually, 
negatively affect firm performance. Notwithstanding the 
agency theory position, the supervision role of board 
may not be the main focal point in the private family 
businesses, where stronger presence of family members 
exist in the management team and board of director as 
well (Maseda et al., 2014; Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-
Santana, 2015). Hence more information flow exist 
between management team and the firm owners, thus 
defeating the traditional agency problem associated with 
divergence of interest due to separation of ownership 
and control (García-Ramos and García-Olalla, 2011a). In 
another vein, the issue of power abuse and extraction of 
private gains of majority holding of family shareholders 
to the detriment of non-family minority shareholders 
which is mostly seen in listed family firms may not be 
the case in private family firms, since the presence non-
family minority shareholders is most unlikely (Cabrera-
Suárez and Santana-Martín, 2004; Bammens et al., 
2011). Because in private family firms, where control is 
in the hand of family, there are more incentives to care 
for the business as it may be inspired by stewardship 
behaviour other than to exploit for personal interest by 
the managers (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011), therefore 
the agency problem associated with owner-manager is 
most likely to be less key in private family firm 
(Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-Santana, 2015). On the card 
of supervisory role, executive directors’ presence on 
boards of private family firms have no potential to 
impact on performance but the provision of advice is 
significant when interactions are based on stewardship 
attitude.  
Davis et al, (1997) advance that the main duty of a board 
is to counsel executives (stewards) in their pro-
organizational endeavors, which is aim at adding to the 
knowledge of management team (Bammens et al., 2011). 
In family business, decisions on managerial position and 
promotion are based on kinship professional exposure 
associated with the position (de Kor et al., 2006). Thus 
family directors prefers to keep and preserve values and 
socio emotional wealth of the family firm (Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2011). This may bring deficit in the expertise 
required to run the firm due to family imposed personnel 
due to exclusive consideration to family without 
recourse to expertise. While executive directors of 
private family firm have deep knowledge about the 
organization, they lack skill and knowledge needed 
through academic exercise and perhaps previous 
experience aside knowledge of the firm, hence again 
limiting strategic options open to the board (Bammens et 
al., 2011). Therefore, we proposed the following 
hypothesis;  
H1.  Higher proportion of executive director on the board 
of private family firm will negatively affect 
performance. 
2.3 Duality in the position of chief executive 
According to Dalton et al. (1998), when the chief 
executive officer (CEO) position of a firm is held by the 
same person as the board chairman, in such a case CEO 
duality as occurred. This issue has generated a lot of 
controversies in literature as to whether this condition 
has positive and/or negative impact on a firm 
performance (Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-Santana, 
2015). Following the traditional agency theory 
arguments, the positions of power of both CEO and 
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board chair held by one person diminishes the capacity 
to supervise. As CEO may abuse power by championing 
his/her own interest to the disadvantage of a firm is well 
held because of lack of appropriate monitoring and thus 
may account for hiring incompetent staff or conservative 
decisions that may affect the firm strategically (García-
Ramos and García-Olalla, 2011b). But in the case of 
private family firms, there will be less problems 
concerning abuse of power due to prevalence 
stewardship attitudes characteristics. As a result 
diminishing problem of abuse of power, if the CEO 
behaves as steward, we believe the CEO interest will be 
aligned with that of others stakeholders in the firm thus 
eliminating opportunistic tendencies. Hence the 
concentration of decision-making capacity and power in 
one person bring positive effect to firm since unity of 
command will exist at the highest levels of management. 
Additionally, Kowalewski et al. (2010) argue that CEOs 
with a longer time period in their positions may be able 
to develop chain of specific advantages associated with 
more opportunities for acquiring and learning about their 
firms when highly committed. Hence, since CEO 
position in private family firms could be held for long 
time and same person as board chair, we hypothesis that: 
H2: If the same person serves as CEO and board chair in 
private family firm, it will positively affect performance.  
2.4 Diversity of family directors   
Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-Santana (2015) posit that 
over time, structures of family firms are likely to evolve 
from controlling owner into sibling partnerships, with 
different proportion of ownership held by single 
generation and/or ownership is fractional between 
different generations (third, fourth or more) (Gersick et 
al. 1997). Thus, vote control is spread among different 
family members who might occupy manager or director 
role with different interest and incentive (Gersick et al. 
1997; Le Breton-Miller et al, 2011). This development 
may have negative tendencies on the family and the 
firm. However, knowing that the strength of family 
social capital is influenced by the relationship between 
family members and stability, to the extent that the 
interaction, interconnection and interdependence among 
the family members are within the family. Therefore, 
social capital element of trust, sense of mutual 
obligation, and identification with the family and the 
firm could weaken as family ties reduces. This could 
make the family vulnerable to conflicts capable of 
division among and/or into generations and fractions in 
the family with the firm bearing the potential and 
ultimate negative consequences in an attempt to reduce 
family members’ involvement in the firm. Advantages 
arising from social capital could be lost due to 
weakening family ties in private family firm and may 
look like public traded family firm. Accordingly, the 
alignment of objective between family owners and 
managers as alluded by stewardship theory, which is the 
intrinsic motivation to the welfare of the firm will be 
eroded. And from the agency theory, this will bring 
about divergence of interest among family member with 
each subdivision within the firm held by a branch of the 
family division seeking to pursuit its own economic and 
non-economic benefit of the nuclear family instead of 
the extended family interest in the firm. This will 
eventually create agency problem and it associated costs 
(García-Ramos and García-Olalla, 2011b). Therefore, 
following the argument we hypothesis that: 
H3: Private Family firm with higher diversity of family 
Directors will have negative effect on performance.   
2.5 Outsider board members role  
Outsider directors are board members who do not belong 
to the management team (Dalton et al., 1998) and/or 
belong to controlling family (Klein, 2007). Coming from 
agency theory viewpoint, outside directors have a greater 
incentive to fulfill the supervisory role and controlling 
executives so that their actions are geared towards 
protecting owners’ interest (Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-
Santana, 2015). Hence, recent governance reforms are 
geared toward board of directors working independent of 
management team, and by this most governance reforms 
endorsed majority outside directors (García-Ramos and 
García-Olalla, 2011b). Now from empirical studies, the 
role of outside directors are mixed for both family listed 
firms and non-family firms. For instance, Garcia-Ramos 
and García-Olalla (2011b) found that independent 
boards improved firm performance for European family 
firms led by their founders and the reverse happens in 
firms led by descendants. Literature may support the 
idea that for private family firms, the contribution of 
outside directors regarding supervisory role may not be 
important since the same person could be the owner and 
manager as well.  Key stakeholders who are insiders are 
expected to care more than outsiders on the health of the 
family firms ( LeBreton-Miller et al., 2011), besides, 
outsiders stand to have little knowledge and context of 
the firm since they do not neither involved in the 
management team nor part of ownership family. Hence, 
Maseda et al. (2014) advance that outsider directors are 
poverty of specific knowledge and information about the 
family firm.  
Therefore, if outsiders are brought on boards in private 
family firm with the intention to controlling managers, it 
may reduce the intrinsic motivation of managers leading 
a potential increase in opportunistic tendencies and 
minimizes pro-organizational behaviour (Bammens et 
al., 2011). This could potentially distort flow of 
communi-cation from managers to outsider directors as 
compare to where all the directors are insiders, this could 
be disadvantageous to decision making of the board. 
This activities could be detrimental to the board 
effectiveness in advisory role and eventually affect 
performance.   
H4: Family firm board with majority outside directors 
will negatively affect performance.   
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2.6 Moderation effect 
On one hand, in contrast to earlier arguments, in certain 
situation outsider board members could be useful to the 
realization of family firm ultimate objective of wealth 
maximization (economic) and non-economic interest. As 
mention already, CEO duality can be positive regarding 
unity of command and better communication flows to 
other management team, since private family business 
dependence on CEO as the ultimate decision maker is 
exclusive and high (Calabrò and Mussolino, 2011). The 
CEO duality role could lead to lack of delegation or 
minimize joint decision making responsibility to the 
detriment of collective responsibility for decision-
making which could be harmful to the firm succession 
and success. From this perspective Maseda et al. (2014) 
suggest that outside directors can contribute vital 
resources to the firm in terms of general knowledge of 
business, contracts and reputation enhancement which 
could foster the advisory role of the board as well as 
improve strategic development and implementation 
process. Calabrò and Mussolino (2011) posit that the 
role played by outside directors can be very useful to the 
development of strategic changes processes in family 
firms by making decisive, distinctive and additional 
contributions to the strategic decision -making processes. 
Thus, we propose the hypothesis that; 
H5 : CEO duality in private family firms will moderate 
the effect of outside board members on the performance 
in a manner that a board with a majority of outside 
directors will have a positive effect on performance 
when CEO duality exist. 
On the other hand, the diversity of family directors 
(distinction between executive and non-executive family 
directors) could lead to arise in agency conflicts with 
corresponding reduction in social capital (Cabrera-
Suárez and Martín-Santana, 2015).  In these situations, 
the role of outside directors is potentially useful, thus 
being able to protect the interest of various interest 
groups involved in the firm being in bed with top 
management and/or resolving conflicts between interest 
groups (Bammens et al., 2008).  The existence of outside 
directors can help reduce information asymmetry among 
various interest groups of the owner-family in the firm 
by intermediating and bring clear an objective counsel to 
issues of conflicts (Calabrò and Mussolino, 2011; 
García-Ramos and García-Olalla, 2011b). Besides, the 
mere presence of outside board members could serve as 
a motivator for the family member to constructively 
manage their internal conflicts (Bettinelli, 2011). In a 
situation where there is low alignment of objectives 
between family owners and family mangers, the role of 
outside directors become critical. Hence we propose a 
hypothesis that  
H6 : The diversity of family directors of private family 
firm will moderate the effect of outside directors on the 
performance in the manner that outside directors will 
have a positive effect on performance when the diversity 
of family is higher .  
3.0 Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We consider a firm to be a family firm if it has at least 
two people who are siblings on the board of directors 
and/or management teams, and the board chair is a 
relation. The presence of siblings in the governing 
bodies implies an intention, and by far transmission of 
leadership between generations in the family; this, in 
turn, is another key factor in the definition of family 
firms (Zellweger et al., 2010). Lastly, the presence of 
family members on the board and the fact that the chair 
of the board is a family member also allows us to infer 
that the ownership of the firm is in fact controlled by the 
family (García-Castro and Casasola, 2011). The 
population of this study was private family firms in 
Ghana, where the firms are predominantly businesses 
with a strong presence of the leading families in the 
board, management and ownership. Using interview, 
questionnaire and annual reports, we analyzed each firm, 
case by case to arrive at the variables employed for this 
study. The questions and interviews together with annual 
reports were sharped to derive the following variables. 
To do this we imposed certain restriction on the firm 
who were affected by certain conditions that wouldn’t 
allow them to be part of the sample. Thus, during the 
course of data gathering process, 367 private family 
businesses were contacted, however, firms in which any 
of the following conditions existed were considered as 
outlier and deleted from the sample. 
1. When the firm is a subsidiary of another already 
included firm 
2. When insolvency administrator is appointed  
3. Non-availability of relevant data for the study    
4. When the firm is chaired by a company 
5. When the families involved were not related in 
anyway  
To also ensure that the characteristics of the firms would 
enable the objectives of the study to be met, firm were 
selected based on the following conditions  
1. The board chair belongs to the family. This was to 
ensure that firms studied were those in which 
members of the family held the highest positions of 
reasonability. 
2. The board members are at least three 
3. The management team have at least responsibility 
positions  
4. The number of employees was 10 or more to avoid 
selection of micro-firms, this will give a real role of 
responsibility to the board. 
5. Not listed and didn’t belong to financial sector 
Finally, 319 firm were included in this study for 
2017 financial year.  
                       Journal of Research in Business, Economics and Management (JRBEM)                                                                                                                                                                      
ISSN: 2395-2210 
Volume 12, Issue 1 available at  www.scitecresearch.com/journals/index.php/jrbem                                 2307 
 
Table 1: Definition of variables 
Acronym  Variable  Description of variables  Expected sign 
PERF Performance 
It measures the productivity as the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of sales to employees in 2016. This measure considered 
to be more trustworthy and less subjective than other figure 
related to profit (Oswald, 2009). 
 
CEOD CEO duality 
This is a dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ when the 
CEO or the general manager is also the board chair otherwise 
‘0’ 
Positive (+) 
EDIR Proportion of 
executive directors  
This is measured as the percentage of executive director 
relative to total number of directors.  
Negative (-) 
ODIR Majority of 
outsider directors  
This is a dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ when the 
proportion of outside directors on the board is more than 50% 
and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Negative (-) 
DDIR Diversity of family 
directors  
This is measured by using absolute value percentage 
difference between executive and non-executive directors.  
Negative (-) 
SIZE Firm size This is measured as total asset of the firm but due to high 
variability natural logarithm of total asset was taken.  
Positive (+) 
FAGE Age of the firm  This was measured as number of years since the establishment 
of the firm. Due to high variability natural logarithm was 
taken. 
Positive (+) 
GROW Firm Growth This was measured as percentage change in the sales relative 
to previous year’s sales. 
Positive (+) 
SECT Sector of activity  This is a dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ when the 
firm belong industrial sector ‘0’ otherwise. 
Negative (-) 
3.2 Moderator effects 
A moderator or an interaction effect occurs when the 
moderator variable, a second independent variable, 
changes the relationship between another independent 
variable and the dependent variable, namely, an effect in 
which a third independent variable (the moderator 
variable) causes the relationship between a 
dependent/independent variable pair to change, 
depending on the value of the moderator variable. The 
moderator effect is represented in multiple regression by 
a compound variable formed by multiplying the 
independent variable by the moderator variable, which is 
entered into the regression equation. The two moderator 
effects proposed in hypotheses H5 and H6 are linked to 
two interaction variables whose purpose is to determine 
the extent to which the effect of a majority of outside 
directors on performance is positive in case of duality 
and/or a higher diversity of family directors. The two  
Moderating variables therefore correspond to the 
following interactions of independent variables: 
4.0 Result  
4.1 Board Structure  
Table 2 below shows the characteristics of board of 
directors in the firms under consideration of this study. 
The analysis denotes that the size of most boards of 
family owned firm are between 3-6 (representing 74.6 
percent). Family owned firms who has 50% or less of its 
executive directors on the board represented 73.7%. 
Private Family owned firms with more than 50% of 
family members’ representation on their boards denoted 
79%.  88.1% of firm with less than 50% outside board 
members representation. The overall conclusion from 
this analysis is that boards are heavily controlled and 
highly influence by families.  
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Table 2: Board Structure 
BOARD CHARACTERISTICS  N % 
BOARD SIZE –   
3 OR 4 
4 OR 6 
7 OR 8 
9 OR 10 
ABOVE 10  
 
156 
82 
43 
24 
14 
 
48.9 
25.7 
13.5 
7.5 
4.4 
PERCENTAGE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 
0 TO   25 PERCENT 
26   TO   50 PERCENT 
51   TO   75 PERCENT 
76   TO 100 PERCENT 
 
106 
129 
63 
21 
 
33.3 
40.4 
19.7 
6.6 
 
PERCENTAGE OF FAMILY DIRECTORS 
1 TO   25 PERCENT 
26   TO   50 PERCENT 
51   TO   75 PERCENT 
76   TO 100 PERCENT 
 
18 
49 
78 
174 
 
5.6 
15.4 
24.5 
54.5 
PERCENTAGE OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 
2 TO   25 PERCENT 
26   TO   50 PERCENT 
51   TO   75 PERCENT 
76   TO 100 PERCENT 
 
193 
88 
27 
11 
 
60.5 
27.6 
8.5 
3.4 
4.2 Analyses 
This study employed hierarchical multiple regression, 
where its normally variant of the basic multiple 
regression process that ensures specification of fixed 
order of entry for variables so us to control for the 
effects of covariates or to test effects of certain 
predictors influence of others. Therefore, this study was 
able to analyze: 
a. The effect of control variables on the dependent 
variable  
b. The joint or combined effect of explanatory 
variables regardless significance levels of the 
control variables   
c. The individual effect of moderating variables in the 
explanatory power of the model. This helps the 
study to predict the predictive power of the 
moderators which was added to the model, 
following changes in R2 . hence if the changes in R2 
shows statistical significance then we observe 
significant moderator effect. Thus, the study  
d. assesses incremental effect only not the individual 
variables.  
e. For the overall level of significance of the model, 
we adopted the adjusted R2 and the F ratio because 
in practice R2 assumes some setbacks when 
comparing models from the goodness to fit 
perspective. 
4.3  Findings  
Before going further to test our hypotheses of the study, 
we tested the existence of multi-colinearity between or 
among the variables in the model. Since in most 
regression analyses, this is one of the problems it 
encounters. On the account of this issue, we deployed 
two means of assessing whether the situation of multi-
colonearity is present among the variables. The variance 
inflation factor (VIF) value together with the tolerance 
levels were analyse as well as correlation matrix 
between the variables were analyse.  
From table 4, we observed that the VIF value were less 
than 10 and that of tolerance levels higher than 0.10 
which is the threshold upon which it could be said that 
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multi-colonearity exist. From the correlation perspective 
in table 3, the continuous variables used in this study 
showed that no coefficients between the variables was 
higher 0.80, hence discriminant validity exist as long as 
coefficients were less than 0.80. We therefore draw 
conclusion that no multi-colinearity exist between the 
variables.  
We tested the hypotheses using hierarchical regression 
analysis, where the variables are entered in successive 
blocks (see table 4). The model I, which happens to be 
the baseline model comprising only the control variables 
{firm size (SIZE), firm age (FAGE), growth (GROW) 
and sector of operation (SECT)}. For the Model II, in 
addition to the control variables it includes all the 
independent variables {CEO duality (CEOD), proportion 
of executive director on the board (EDIR), majority of 
outside director on the board (ODIR), diversity of family 
directors on the board (DDIR)}. In addition to the 
variables in the II, we include moderator (interaction 
term between CEOD and ODIR) and (interaction 
between DDIR and ODIR ) to form the model III and IV 
respectively. In the model III and IV, it allow recording 
combination effect of the moderators on the performance 
of the family owned firm. It should be noted, empirical 
evidence shows that an increase of more than one 
percent should be measured as significant, hence 
assumes the existence of moderating effect. 
The regression results from model I in table 4 indicates 
that the sector in which a family firms operate or 
involved in influence its performance. In this case firms 
that operate in the manufacturing sector influence the 
ratio of sales to employees of the firms. The size of the 
firm and the rate of growth in sales equally influence the 
performance of the family owned firm but we found no 
evidence suggesting that ages of a family owned firm 
affect performance.  
The model II in table 4, we estimated the regression 
results by adding the four main independent variables to 
the control variables. It could be seen that a significant 
change happened in the determination coefficient 
(change in R2 - 6.98%, change in F – 12.23, p – 0.000) in 
the model II, indicating significant effect of the main 
regressors when applied on the dependent variable. 
Hence the effect of board of directors’ structure or 
composition on the family-owned firm performance is 
established. Following the results of the findings, the 
following conclusions are drawn:  
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 There is a significant positive relationship between 
CEO duality role and the performance private family 
owned firm. This illustrations that having the same 
person as board chairperson and the CEO in a private 
family business positively affect performance. 
Following this finding hypothesis (H1) is accepted. 
 the presence of majority directors being outsider of a 
private family owned firm board has a significant 
negative effect on the performance of the firm. This 
indicates that as more and more persons who are not 
members of the family who owned the firm reduces 
the performance of the firm, therefore hypothesis 
(H2) is accepted . 
 We observed that higher diversity of family directors 
has a significant negative relationship with the 
performance of private family owned firm. Again, 
this finding shows that as more diverse the board of a 
private family owned business becomes, it worsens 
the performance of the firm, due to the emergence of 
competing interest of the blocks within the family. 
Base on this hypothesis (H3) is accepted.  
 We find no significant relationship between 
proportion of executive director on the private family 
owned firms and performance. However, the 
relationship was positive. Since the was expected 
sign was negative, the hypothesis (H4) is rejected. 
Furthermore, in the estimation of model III and IV, which 
includes two moderators into model II to estimate the 
coefficients of the moderating effect considered 
independently. Result of this estimation model is also 
illustrated in table 4. As it is observed from the results 
obtained, the incorporation of moderator variable 
(CEOD*ODIR) into model II to estimate model III shows 
that there was a significant increase in the determination 
coefficient (change in R2  - 2.45%, change in F – 0.63*** ). 
On the bases of this the effect of the moderator variable 
has negative statistically significant at 1 percent level of 
significance. This finding suggest that a majority of 
outside directors on the board of private family owned 
firm has a negative effect on the performance of CEO 
where duality of role exist, therefore hypothesis (H5 ) is 
rejected. If CEO duality exist in private family owned 
firm, it positive effect on performance is lesser, because it 
has negative moderator effect on the relationship between 
majority of outside directors and performance. Or the 
effect of majority of outside directors’ effect on 
performance outweighs the effect of CEO duality on 
performance.  The coefficient of (-0.5484) indicates the 
unitary change in the effect of CEO duality on the 
performance when proportion of outside directors’ 
changes. Therefore, if the proportion outside is more than 
50%, it reduces the total effect of CEO duality on 
performance and the reverse is truth of the outside 
director proportion is lesser than 50%.  
On the account of the second moderator 
variable(DDIR*ODIR), the effect is not significant on 
performance. The incorporation of this variable into 
model II to estimate model IV, did not sufficiently 
increase the determination coefficient (change in R2 – 
0.53%; F – 2.52), so hypothesis (H6) is rejected. 
Finally, to test the reliability and validity of the results of 
model III and IV and guarantee the robustness of the 
findings, we tested the normality of the residuals 
(Kolmogorow-Smirmov Z-test 1.379, p- 0.048 and Z-test- 
1.389, p- 0.041 respectively) and this shows normality of 
the residuals.  Furthermore, to validate the robustness of 
the model, the study carried out robustness check by 
using return on asset as a measure of performance 
(dependent variable). We find no significant differences 
when it comes to authenticating the hypotheses of the 
study and the coefficients.  
5.0 Discussion and Conclusions  
Our study empirically contribute to under-studied existing 
evidence in the area of private family owned business 
governance. This study gains more relevance due to 
stronger family ties and steward attitude of a board of 
private family firms, gives more interest in the board role 
of such firms. In trying to explain board role using 
agency theory we join with complementary theory of 
stewardship theory to demonstrate board composition and 
its effect on private family owned business performance. 
Existing studies on family firms’ governance chiefly 
applied theoretical argument coming from traditional 
literature of family firms and adopted data of listed 
family firms. Hence, using data from private family 
owned firms, we make important contribution to family 
firm literature. In summary, the study concludes that 
board composition of board of directors of private family 
owned firms affects the performance. However, it must 
be noted somehow, the structure of the board of private 
family owned firms might be different from what has 
been suggested in general literature of board.  
As we look forward to, the results indicate that having the 
same person leading the board (board chair) and 
management team (chief executive officer) has positive 
effect on the performance of private family owned firm. 
On one hand the results in this study is consistent with the 
findings of (Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-Santana, 2015) 
who studied non-listed family owned firms. based on this, 
duality could be a way of giving firms advantage of unity 
of command at the highest level of management, such as 
greater response to capacity, clearer and single 
understanding of strategic orientation and greater 
autonomy. Additionally, in private family firms leaders 
tend to consolidate their power to management for a long 
period of time, it becomes advantageous to the firm by 
acquiring or learning specific knowledge of their firms 
(Miller and Le Breton-Muller, 2006). We believe that 
private family owned firms promote the level of 
commitment of the family leader which intend stimulate 
stewardship behaviour. On the other hand, the results 
differ from the results obtained by (Braun and Sharma, 
2007; Lam and Lee, 2007), who studied public firms 
controlled family firms. Therefore, how the CEO duality 
affect performance of firms operated as private owned 
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family firms differ from that of the public or listed family 
owned firm. While in private family firm duality 
improves performance, the reverse is the case when the 
firm is traded public.  
Furthermore, we found the existence of outside directors 
has negative influence on performance of private family 
owned firms. This results confirms the findings of 
(Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-Santana, 2015). The results 
seems to suggest that the benefit derived from outside 
directors in term of supervisory capacity and wider base 
of available resources to firm are offset by the losses 
arising from commitment level, trust, lack of knowledge 
of the firm and other gains related to social capital 
associated with outsiders on the board. Ordinary outsiders 
may not be effective in the monitoring and supervisory 
process because in family owned business certain 
strategic family information that affect the firm maybe 
hidden from those of outside (non-family members) 
which will eventually impede their service to the firm 
board.  
We found evidence to support our hypothesis that higher 
diversity of family directors negatively impact on the 
performance of private family owned firms. The 
differentiation between executive and non-executive 
directors of a family owned firms implies increase in the 
divergence of interests or better agency conflict may arise 
between the two set of directors. This may go further to 
affect the family ties and related benefits of social capital 
may be affect due to the distinction between the directors 
of the family. As the board become diverse it affect the 
ability of the family to govern themselves and therefore 
lacks unity of interest. This eventually will create 
divergence of interest hence impeding performance. 
Therefore, consultants of family businesses may well 
advice and help owners of family business to develop 
balanced equilibrium insider and outsider directors on the 
board since each group of directors are significant to the 
survival and growth of the business.  
No evidence was established to support the hypothesis 
that higher proportion of executive directors on the board 
affect performance negatively because of the fact that a 
typical agency problem related to opportunistic behaviour 
are uncommon is family owned firms. Diversity of views 
from management team of those who are not on the board 
of firms with higher presence of executive directors on 
board are accommodated.  
In conclusion, further studies should consider or explore 
the relationship between governance, the management of 
human resources available to the firm from the family in 
private family owned firms since the decision of 
promotion and position of these firms are based on 
kinship instead of professional skills. Again, since 
performance of family owned firm can not only be 
understood in terms of board composition but also other 
dynamics, another further studies may explore boards’ 
concentration on decision-making and problem 
coordination. Furthermore, decision coordination as CEO 
duality exist in family owned firms, it impact of financial 
performance.   
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